As one of fundamental properties to characterize inconsistency measures for knowledge bases, the property of free formula independence well captures the intuition that free formulas are independent of the amount of inconsistency in a knowledge base for cases where inconsistency is characterized in terms of minimal inconsistent subsets. But it has been argued that not all the free formulas are independent of inconsistency in some other contexts of inconsistency characterization. In this paper, we propose a characterization of formulas independent of inconsistency in the framework of Priest's minimally inconsistent LP. Based on an atom-based counterpart of the notion of free formula, we propose a notion of Bi-free formula to describe formulas that are free from inconsistency in both syntax and paraconsistent models in this logic. Then we propose the property of Bi-free formula independence, which is more suitable for characterizing the role of formulas free from inconsistency in measuring inconsistency from both syntactic and semantic perspectives.
Introduction
Inconsistency handling is one of the important issues in knowledge representation and reasoning. In particular, it has been increasingly recognized that measuring inconsistency is a useful way to facilitate the process of inconsistency handling in a variety of applications such as requirements engineering (Mu, Hong, Jin, & Liu, 2013a; Mu, Jin, Liu, Zowghi, & Wei, 2013b) , belief change (Hunter & Konieczny, 2010) , news reports (Hunter, 2006) , network security and intrusion detection (McAreavey, Liu, Miller, & Mu, 2011) , and medical experts systems (Muiño, 2011) . Techniques for measuring inconsistency for knowledge bases have been paid much attention recently (Liu & Mu, 2017) . Here a knowledge base refers to a finite set of propositional formulas. Instead of considering any two inconsistent knowledge bases equally bad, the approach to measuring inconsistency gives a quantitative assessment for the inconsistency arising in a knowledge base in order to make a finegrained distinction among inconsistent knowledge bases. Without loss of generality, we assume that an inconsistency measure is a function from the set of all knowledge bases to [0, +∞) such that the higher the value assigned to a knowledge base, the more inconsistent that knowledge base is.
A growing number of inconsistency measures have been proposed so far (Knight, 2002 (Knight, , 2003 Grant, 1978; Grant & Hunter, 2006; Hunter & Konieczny, 2010; Xiao, Lin, Ma, & Qi, 2010; Konieczny, Lang, & Marquis, 2003; Hunter, 2004; Hunter & Konieczny, 2010; Jabbour, Ma, & Raddaoui, 2014; Jabbour, Ma, Raddaoui, Sais, & Salhi, 2016; Mu, Liu, & Jin, 2011a; Mu, Liu, Jin, & Bell, 2011b; Mu, Wang, & Wen, 2014; Mu, 2015 Mu, , 2018 Thimm, 2017) . A more detailed survey of inconsistency measures has been given by Thimm (2018) . Although each of these measures was proven to exhibit some good behaviors tailed to some certain (often restricted) perspectives, it has been reported that different inconsistency measures may bring different (possibly incompatible) characterizations of inconsistent knowledge bases (Grant & Hunter, 2011a . Such a dilemma makes properties for characterizing desirable inconsistency measures more necessary. MU The set of basic properties presented by Konieczny (2006, 2008) provides a good starting point for characterizing inconsistency measures. A number of variants of Hunter and Konieczny's properties have been proposed by adapting or revising some ones of this set (Mu et al., 2011b; Jabbour et al., 2014 Jabbour et al., , 2016 Besnard, 2014 Besnard, , 2017 . Hunter and Konieczny's set of basic properties consists of Normalization, Consistency, Monotony, Dominance, and Free Formula Independence. Roughly speaking, the property of Consistency requires that any inconsistency measure should assign 0 to exactly all the consistent knowledge bases. It gives a very primitive requirement on nonnegative inconsistency measures, i.e., the ability to distinguish an inconsistent knowledge base from all consistent ones. It aims to guarantee a measure is indeed an inconsistency measure (Thimm, 2009) . As an optional property, Normalization is used to adjust values of an inconsistency measure into [0, 1] . The property of Monotony requires that the inconsistency value cannot decrease when a knowledge base is enlarged, while the property of Dominance characterizes the intuition that logically stronger formulas bring more conflicts.
The property of Free Formula Independence aims to capture an intuition that formulas independent of inconsistency have no impact on the assessment of inconsistency in a knowledge base. Here free formulas of a knowledge base refer to ones that are not involved in any minimal inconsistent subset (an inconsistent subset without a proper inconsistent subset) of the knowledge base. Then Free Formula Independence grasps the intuition well in the context of inconsistency characterized by minimal inconsistent subsets.
Characterizing inconsistency in terms of minimal inconsistent subsets provides a syntactic perspective to analyze the inconsistency in a knowledge base. Besides this, atoms assigned to nonclassical truth values by some paraconsistent models such as Belnap's four-valued semantics (Belnap, 1977; Arieli & Avron, 1998 ) and Priest's LP m semantics (1991) have been also used to characterize inconsistency (Hunter & Konieczny, 2010; Ma, Qi, & Hitzler, 2011) . However, the independence of free formulas from minimal inconsistent subsets cannot ensure that the property of Free Formula Independence is also appropriate for characterizing atom-centric inconsistency measures stemming from the inconsistency characterization based on paraconsistent models (Hunter & Konieczny, 2010) . Here atom-centric inconsistency measures refer to ones that take into account the proportion of the language involved in inconsistency (Hunter & Konieczny, 2010) . Then the property of Free Formula Independence has been weakened to characterize such situations by replacing free formulas with safe formulas (Thimm, 2009; Hunter & Konieczny, 2010) . Here, a safe formula of a knowledge base refers to a consistent formula that does not contain any atom appearing in other formulas of the base.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the notion of safe formula cannot cover the tautology, which is free from inconsistency in intuition (Besnard, 2017) . Then an alternative set of Hunter and Konieczny's properties has been presented by Besnard, in which two postulates Tautology Independence and Conjunct Independence together entail that adding a formula safely consistent for a knowledge base to that base has no impact on the inconsistency assessment of that base (Besnard, 2017) . Here we say that a formula is safely consistent for a knowledge base if some substitution of the formula obtained by replacing all the occurrences of some of its atoms not appearing in formulas of that base with one or other of the two constants ⊤ (true) and ⊥ (false) is a tautology (Besnard, 2017) . We call such a formula safely consistent formula for the simplicity of discussion from now on. It has been shown that a new safe formula for a knowledge base is also a safely consistent formula for that base (Besnard, 2017) . However, if we consider only the formulas built upon atoms involved in a knowledge base, then such a safely consistent formula for that base must be a tautol-ogy, as we will show later. This implies that the term of safely consistent formula is not general enough to cover formulas free from inconsistency characterization.
In this paper, we propose an atom-centric characterization of formulas that are independent of inconsistency in Priest's minimally inconsistent LP (Logic of Paradox) LP m (1991), which is one of the simple paraconsistent logics often used to exemplify the inconsistency characterization in terms of paraconsistent semantics (Konieczny et al., 2003; Hunter & Konieczny, 2010) . At first, we characterize free formulas from the perspective that the removal of such a formula from a knowledge base cannot change the minimal inconsistent subsets of that base. Inspired by this invariance of minimal inconsistent subsets, we then propose a new counterpart of the notion of free formula, which is used to capture formulas that are independent of atom-centric inconsistency characterization of a knowledge base in minimally inconsistent LP LP m . We show that the atomcentric counterpart can cover the tautology, the safe formula and the safely consistent formula. But the counterpart cannot rule out some formulas not really free from minimal inconsistent subsets. That is, such a semantic characterization of independence may lead to some undesired result in syntactic aspect. Then we enhance the counterpart and propose a notion of Bi-free formula, which is used to capture formulas that are independent of both syntactic and atom-centric inconsistency characterization in the framework of Priest's minimally inconsistent LP. Moreover, we show that our counterparts are more general than the other alternatives of free formulas. Finally, the corresponding counterparts of the property of Free Formula Independence are also given.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some necessary notions about inconsistency characterization for knowledge bases. In Section 3, we introduce alternatives of the property of Free Formula Independence. In Section 4, we propose the notion of B-atomfree formula, which is a counterpart of free formula in the context of atom-centric inconsistency characterization in Priest's minimally inconsistent LP LP m . In Section 5, we propose the notion of Bi-free formula, which is appropriate for characterizing formulas free from both syntactic and semantic inconsistency characterization in the framework of Priest's LP m . In Section 6, we discuss a new alternative of Hunter and Konieczny's properties based on the notion of Bi-free formula. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 7.
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we use a finite propositional language. Let P be a finite set of propositional atoms (or variables) and L a propositional language built from P and two propositional constants ⊤ (true) and ⊥ (false) under connectives {¬, ∧, ∨}. We use a, b, c, · · · to denote propositional atoms, and α, β, γ, · · · to denote propositional formulas. In addition, we use α ≡ ⊤ to denote that α is a tautology.
A knowledge base K is a finite set of propositional formulas. For any two disjoint knowledge bases K 1 and K 2 , we use K 1 + K 2 instead of K 1 ∪ K 2 to denote the union of K 1 and K 2 .
Given a knowledge base K, we use At(K) to denote the set of atoms appearing in formulas of
K is inconsistent if there is a formula α such that K ⊢ α and K ⊢ ¬α, where ⊢ is the classical consequence relation. We use K ⊢ ⊥ (resp. K ̸ ⊢ ⊥) to denote that a knowledge base K is inconsistent (resp. consistent).
An inconsistent subset K ′ of K is called a minimal inconsistent subset of K if no proper subset of K ′ is inconsistent. Minimal inconsistent subsets of a knowledge base can be regarded as a char-acterization of inconsistency of that base from a syntactic perspective, since one needs to remove only one formula from each minimal inconsistent subset in order to resolve the inconsistency (Reiter, 1987) . In this paper, we use MI(K) to denote the set of all the minimal inconsistent subsets of K, i.e.,
A formula in K is called a free formula if this formula does not belong to any minimal inconsistent subset of K (Hunter & Konieczny, 2006) . We use FF(K) to denote the set of free formulas of K.
Note that an inconsistent knowledge base K has no classical model. Some paraconsistent models have been proposed to characterize inconsistent knowledge bases in semantics. It has been stated that Priest's minimally inconsistent LP (Logic of Paradox) LP m (1991) is appropriate for exemplifying such a characterization since it is simple enough but agrees with classical logic whenever the knowledge base is consistent (Konieczny et al., 2003) .
The LP m model (Priest, 1991) of knowledge bases is given in the framework of Priest's Logic of Paradox (Priest's LP for short) (1979) . Roughly speaking, Priest's LP provides three-valued models for classically inconsistent knowledge bases by expanding the classical truth values {T, F} to the set {T, F, {T, F}}, in which the third truth value {T, F} (also abbreviated as B in Hunter & Konieczny, 2010; Konieczny et al., 2003) is considered intuitively as both true and false (Priest, 1991) . Here we use the following notations and the concepts about the LP m model used by Hunter and Konieczny (2010) . An interpretation ω for LP m models maps each propositional variable to one of the three truth values T, F, B such that
Then the set of models of a formula α is defined as Mod LP (α) = {ω|ω(α) ∈ {T, B}}. Further, the set of models of a knowledge base K is defined as
Let K be a knowledge base and ω be a model of K, then we use ω!(K) to denote the set of propositional variables of K assigned to B by ω, i.e., ω!
We use MinMod LP (K) to denote the set of minimal models of K. Essentially, each minimal model ω ∈ MinMod LP (K) is one of the "most classical" models of K, and ω!(K) describes a minimal set of atoms that have to be assigned to B by ω. We call the elements of ω!(K) the B-atoms of ω w.r.t. K if ω is a minimal model of K. From now on, we use B(ω) to denote the set of B-atoms of the minimal model ω.
Based on minimal models, the LP m consequence relation is defined by
Then α is a LP m consequence of K if all the most classical models of K are models of α.
Inconsistency measures aim to evaluate the inconsistency in each knowledge base based on some inconsistency characterizations such as minimal inconsistent subsets and LP m models, and then to distinguish knowledge bases from some perspectives. To characterize desirable inconsistency measures, some properties or postulates have been proposed so far. In particular, Hunter and Konieczny's set of properties (2006, 2008) has been considered as a good starting point for developing postulates. Without loss of generality, we assume that an inconsistency measure I assigns every knowledge base K a nonnegative number I(K) such that the higher the value of a non-negative inconsistency measure, the more inconsistent a knowledge base is. Under this assumption, the set of basic properties proposed by Konieczny (2006, 2008) can be given as follows:
• Consistency : I(K) = 0 if and only if K is consistent.
• Monotony:
The property of Consistency says that 0 is the designated value of any inconsistency measure for all consistent knowledge bases. The property of Normalization says that the range of an inconsistency measure can be [0, 1]. In this paper we ignore this optional property. The property of Monotony requires that the inconsistency measure is monotonic w.r.t. the extension of a knowledge base, whilst the property of Dominance requires that the inconsistency measure needs to capture the intuition that replacing a formula with another logically stronger one may bring more conflicts. The property of Free Formula Independence requires that the inconsistency measure needs to be independent of free formulas of a knowledge base. In this paper, we focus on the property of Free Formula Independence and its variants.
Alternatives of Free Formulas Independence
The intent of Free Formula Independence is to capture the intuition that formulas free from inconsistency of a knowledge base have no impact on the evaluation of the inconsistency of that base. In the expression of this property, the term free formula is used to characterize formulas free from inconsistency. Note that free formulas are free from minimal inconsistent subsets in essence. Then the expression of Free Formula Independence captures its intent well in the context of inconsistency being characterized by minimal inconsistent subsets.
It has been reported that not all the free formulas are free from the inconsistency of a knowledge bases from other contexts of inconsistency characterization (Hunter & Konieczny, 2010) . To illustrate this, consider K = {a ∧ ¬a ∧ b, ¬b, c}, where both ¬b and c are free formulas of K. However, ¬b is different from c in the sense that K conveys information about both b and ¬b. Actually, the atom b is assigned to the truth value B by a unique minimal model of K, whilst c is assigned to T by the minimal model. Then a weaker alternative of Free Formula Independence, called Safe Formula Independence, has been proposed to accommodate such cases (Hunter & Konieczny, 2010) : (Hunter & Konieczny, 2010; Thimm, 2017) . For example, c is a unique safe formula of {a ∧ ¬a ∧ b, ¬b, c}.
A safe formula is a special kind of free formula. The independence of the safe formula of the inconsistency in a knowledge base stems from the split of atoms of that knowledge base. On the other hand, such a dependence on the split of atoms makes the term safe formula restricted in coverage. For example, the free formula d∧e is independent of the inconsistency in {c, ¬c∧d, d∧e} because there is only the conflict between c and ¬c in both syntax and LP m semantics, but it isn't a safe formula. However, Besnard has argued that the term safe formula cannot cover tautologies, and then this weaker version does not entail the following property of Tautology Independence (Besnard, 2017) , which is a straightforward consequence of Free Formula Independence:
Then the property of Free Formula Independence is replaced by Tautology Independence, together with the following property of Conjunct Independence (Besnard, 2017) :
Moreover, it has been shown that Tautology Independence and Conjunct Independence together entails that I(K ∪ {α}) = I(K) if α is safely consistent for K (Besnard, 2017) .
Here a formula α is safely consistent for K (a safely consistent formula of K ∪ {α} for short in this paper) if there exists a substitution σ such that σα 1 is a tautology and σa = a for all a ∈ At(K), but either σb = b or σb = ⊥ or σb = ⊤ for all b ∈ At({α}) \ At(K) (Besnard, 2017) . Roughly speaking, such a formula has at least one classical model such that any valuation obtained from the model by changing truth assignments to atoms appearing in formulas of K is also a model of the formula. That is, models of such a formula can assign any truth values to atoms appearing in formulas of K. For example, consider K = {a, ¬a} and c ∨ a. Obviously, any valuation ω such that ω(c) = T is a model of c ∨ a, regardless of the truth value assigned to a by ω. Then the substitution σ(c ∨ a) = ⊤ ∨ a of c ∨ a by replacing c with the constant ⊤ is a tautology. So, c ∨ a is safely consistent for K. It has been shown that the term safely consistent formula can cover safe formulas, that is, if α is a safe formula for K ∪ {α}, then α is safely consistent for K (Besnard, 2017) .
The B-Atom-Free Formula
The safely consistent formula is more general than the safe formula. It covers the tautology as well. In particular, the following proposition shows that if a safely consistent formula of a knowledge base has no atom different from ones of other formulas, then it must be a tautology.
Proposition 4.1 Let K be a knowledge base and α a formula safely consistent for K such that At({α}) ⊆ At(K), then α is a tautology.
Proof Let K be a knowledge base and α a safely consistent formula of K ∪ {α}, then there exists a substitution σ such that σα is a tautology and σa = a for all a ∈ At(K). If At({α}) ⊆ At(K), then σα = α. So, α is a tautology.
Evidently, we can get the following result from this proposition.
Corollary 4.1 Let K be a knowledge base and α ∈ K. If α is safely consistent for K, then α is a tautology.
On the other hand, this proposition implies that the notion of safely consistent formula is not general enough to capture the formula free from inconsistency in the case where the formula is built upon atoms of other formulas of a base. To illustrate this, consider
Then b ∧ c is neither a safe formula nor a safely consistent formula of K 0 . However, the free formula b ∧ c of K 0 is free from inconsistency in both syntax and paraconsistent semantics because neither b nor c is assigned to the inconsistent truth value B by the minimal model of K 0 .
The following example also shows that the notion of safely consistent formula is not general enough to capture the formula free from inconsistency in Priest's LP m .
Note that b ∧ c is a free formula of K such that neither b nor c is assigned to B by the minimal model ω 1 of K 1 . This means that b ∧ c is free from inconsistency characterization in Priest's LP m . But b ∧ c is neither a safe formula of K nor a safely consistent formula for K 1 .
In this section, we focus on characterizing formulas free from inconsistency in the framework of Priest's LP m . We start with the following characterization of the role of free formulas in terms of invariance of minimal inconsistent subsets. Let K be a knowledge base and α ∈ K. Then This characterization inspires us to characterize the formulas free from inconsistency in the framework of Priest's LP m using the invariance of inconsistency characterization. Intuitively, for each minimal model of K, the B-atoms B(ω) of ω w.r.t. K are exactly ones that have to be considered contradictory when we give a definitely true or false value to other atoms. We use BA(K) to denote the set of all B-atoms of minimal models of K, i.e., BA(K) = {B(ω)|ω ∈ MinMod LP (K)}. Then BA(K) can be considered as a characterization of inconsistency in K from an atom-centric perspective.
Note that in the framework of Priest's LP m , neither the notion of safely consistent formulas nor that of safe formulas for a knowledge base can cover the formulas associated with the invariance of B-atoms. To illustrate this, consider the following example. To capture the invariance of inconsistency characterization in the framework of Priest's LP m , we give the following counterpart of the notion of free formula. Essentially, the independence of the B-atom-free formula of inconsistency characterization stems from the invariance of the set of B-atoms in Priest's LP m . In this sense, the notion of Batom-free formula captures the underlying idea of free formula.
The following proposition shows that the notion of B-atom-free formula can cover both the tautology and the safe formula.
Proposition 4.2 Let K be a knowledge base and α ∈ K.
(1) If α ≡ ⊤, then α is a B-atom-free formula of K.
(2) If α is a safe formula, then α is a B-atom-free formula of K.
Proof Let K be a knowledge base and α ∈ K.
(1) If α ≡ ⊤, then α must be a tautology in Priest's LP (1979) . So, any 3-valued interpretation ω is a model of α in LP. Therefore, BA(K) = BA(K \ {α}). It has been stated that if α is safely consistent for K, then α is free for K (Besnard, 2017 ). The following proposition shows that the notion of B-atom-free formula can cover safely consistent formulas.
Proposition 4.3 Let K be a knowledge base and α a formula. If α is safely consistent for K, then α is a B-atom-free formula of K ∪ {α}.
Proof Let α be safely consistent for K. If α ∈ K, then K ∪ {α} = K. By Corollary 4.1 and Proposition 4.2, we get that α is a B-atom-free formula of K.
If α ̸ ∈ K, then there exists a substitution σ such that σα is a tautology and (1) σa = a for all a ∈ At(K),
Further, the set of atoms of α can be divided into the following four subsets:
• Let ω be a minimal model of
Otherwise, we adapt ω to ω ′ in view of the substitution σ as follows:
Note that σα is also a tautology in LP (Priest, 1979) {α}) . This contradicts the minimality of ω.
Let ω be a minimal model of K ∪ {α}, then the previous part of the proof shows that ω is also a minimal model of K, moreover, ω!(K ∪ {α}) = ω!(K). So, BA(K ∪ {α}) ⊆ BA(K).
On the other hand, for any minimal model ω of K, we can adapt ω to ω ′ in view of the substitution σ as follows:
Now we are ready to replace the property of Free Formula Independence with the following property:
• B-atom-free Formula Independence: If α is a B-atom-free formula of K, then I(K \ {α}) = I(K). 
Bi-Free Formulas
As a counterpart of the notion of free formula, the B-atom-free formula is defined on the invariance of inconsistency characterization. In the framework of Priest's LP m , the inconsistency of a knowledge base is characterized by B-atoms of minimal models of that base. Similar to the case of free formula, the minimality involved in inconsistency characterization makes the notion of B-atom-free formula cover some formulas that are not really free from minimal inconsistent subsets. That is, the invariance of inconsistency characterization in terms of minimal models cannot ensure that a B-atom-free formula must be a free formula. To illustrate this, consider the following example.
On the other hand, as illustrated by the following example, not all the free formulas of a knowledge base are really independent of B-atoms in the framework of Priest's LP m . We also need to exclude such a type of free formulas from free formulas.
However, we can characterize the free formulas that are not really independent of inconsistency characterization by the notion of false B-independent formula in the framework of Priest's LP m .
Definition 5.1 Let K be a knowledge base and α a free formula of K. We call α a false Bindependent formula of K if ∃S ⊂ K s.t. S ⊢ ⊥ and BA(S) ̸ = BA(S ∪ {α}).
Note that the B-atom-free formulas describe ones that are free from contradictory atoms in minimal paraconsistent models, while the free formulas characterize ones that are from minimal inconsistent subsets in syntax. To address this, we propose a notion of Bi-free formula to describe formulas that are free from inconsistency characterization in both syntax and paraconsistent semantics.
Definition 5.2 Let K be a knowledge base and α ∈ K. Then we call α a Bi-free formula of K if for all S ⊆ K s.t. α ∈ S, it holds that BA(S) = BA(S \ {α}). Note that for any M ∈ MI(K), BA(M ) ̸ = BA(M \ {α}) = ∅ for all α ∈ M . Then all the Bi-free formulas are free formulas. However, the following proposition shows that the notion of Bi-free formula can exclude the false B-independent formula.
Proposition 5.1 Let K be a knowledge base and α a Bi-free formula of K. Then α is not a false B-independent formula of K.
Proof If α is a Bi-free formula of K, then ∀S ⊆ K s.t. α ∈ S, it holds that BA(S) = BA(S\{α}). So, α is not a false B-independent formula of K.
Interestingly, we show that if α is a Bi-free formula, then α is a both B-atom-free and free formula.
Proposition 5.2 Let K be a knowledge base and α ∈ K. If α is a Bi-free formula of K, then BA(K) = BA(K \ {α}) and MI(K) = MI(K \ {α}).
Proof Let K be a knowledge base and α ∈ K. If α is a Bi-free formula of K, then ∀S ⊆ K s.t. α ∈ S, it holds that BA(S) = BA(S \ {α}). Obviously, it holds that BA(K) = BA(K \ {α}). Note that α being a false B-independent formula of K does not necessarily imply that BA(K) ̸ = BA(K \ {α}). To illustrate this, consider
holds. However, we have a more interesting characterization of Bi-free formulas in the case that for any false B-independent formula α of K, it holds that BA(K) ̸ = BA(K \ {α}).
Proposition 5.3 Let K be a knowledge base such that BA(K) ̸ = BA(K \ {β}) for any false Bindependent formula β. Then α ∈ K is a Bi-free formula of K if and only if BA(K) = BA(K \{α}) and MI(K) = MI(K \ {α}).
Proof Let K be a knowledge base and α ∈ K. By Proposition 5.2, if α is a Bi-free formula of K, then BA(K) = BA(K \ {α}) and MI(K) = MI(K \ {α}).
On the other hand, let α ∈ K such that BA(K) = BA(K \ {α}) and MI(K) = MI(K \ {α}). Suppose that there exists ∃S ⊂ K such that α ∈ S and BA(S) ̸ = BA(S \ {α}). If S \ {α} is consistent then S ∈ MI(K) and α ∈ S, it contradicts that MI(K) = MI(K \ {α}). If S \ {α} is inconsistent then α is a false B-independent formula of K. So, BA(K) ̸ = BA(K \ {α}). It contradicts BA(K) = BA(K \ {α}).
Therefore, ∀S ⊆ K s.t. α ∈ S, it holds that BA(S) = BA(S \ {α}). That is, α is a Bi-free formula of K.
Corollary 5.1 Let K be a knowledge base such that BA(K) ̸ = BA(K \ {β}) for any false independent formula β. Then α ∈ K is a false B-independent formula if and only if MI(K) = MI(K \ {α}) but BA(K) ̸ = BA(K \ {α}).
Corollary 5.2 Let K be a knowledge base and α ∈ K.
(1) If α is a tautology, then α is a Bi-free formula.
(2) If α is a safe formula, then α is a Bi-free formula.
(1) If α is a tautology, then for all S ⊆ K \ {α}, ω is a minimal model of S if and only if ω is a minimal model of S ∪ {α}. Then BA(S) = BA(S ∪ {α}). So, α is a Bi-free formula.
(2) If α is a safe formula, then for all S ⊆ K \ {α}, then any minimal model ω of S ∪ {α} is also a minimal model of S. On the other hand, for any minimal model ω of S, there exists a minimal model ω ′ of S ∪ {α} such that ω ′ !(S ∪ {α}) = ω!(S). Then BA(S) = BA(S ∪ {α}). So, α is a Bi-free formula.
Proposition 5.4 Let K be a knowledge base and α a formula. If α is safely consistent for K, then α is a Bi-free formula of K ∪ {α}.
Proof Let α be safely consistent for K. If α ∈ K, then K ∪ {α} = K. By Corollary 4.1 and Corollary 5.2, we get that α is a Bi-free formula of K. If α ̸ ∈ K, then α is also safely consistent for S for all S ⊆ K. So, α is a B-atom-free formula of S ∪ {α}. Then it holds that BA(S) = BA(S ∪ {α}). Therefore, α is a Bi-free formula of K ∪ {α}.
On the other hand, the following example shows that a Bi-free formula α of K is not necessarily safely consistent for K \ {α}.
We use BIFF(K), BAFF (K), FBF (K), SCF(K), SF (K), and T (K) to denote the sets of Bi-free formulas, B-atom-free formulas, false B-independent formulas, safely consistent formulas, safe formulas, and tautologies of K, respectively. In summary, we obtain the following results illustrated by Fig. 1 (a Note that in the framework of Priest's LP m , if we only consider the measures based on the minimal models, then for such a measure I, it always hold that I(K ∪ {α, β}) = I(K ∪ {α ∧ β}). Then assuming Bi-free Formula Independence entails Conjunct Independence in this case.
In summary, the entailment of the other properties of independence from the Bi-free Formula Independence in the framework of Priest's LP m is given in Fig. 1(b) , where FFI, BAFFI, BFFI, SCFI, SF I, T I, and CI are used to denote Free Formula Independence, B-atom-free Formula Independence, Bi-free Formula Independence, Safely Consistent Formula Independence, Safe Formula Independence, Tautology Independence, and Conjunct Independence, respectively. 
A New Alternative of Hunter and Konieczny's Properties
Informally speaking, the property of B-atom-free Formula Independence may be considered as a counterpart of Free Formula Independence for characterizing inconsistency measures based on minimal models, whilst the property of Bi-free Formula Independence is meaningful for both syntaxbased and (paraconsistent) model-based measures in the framework of Priest's LP m . By replacing the property of Free Formula Independence with the properties of B-atom-free Formula Independence and Bi-free Formula Independence, respectively, we get two alternative sets of Hunter and Konieczny's properties.
In addition, Besnard argued that it is necessary to impose a condition α ̸ ∈ K on the formula α involved in Dominance (Besnard, 2017) . Here we take this new form of Dominance.
Let us consider the measure I LPm (Hunter & Konieczny, 2006 , one of measures often used to exemplify atom-centric inconsistency measuring, which satisfies all the Hunter and Konieczny's properties except Free Formula Independence (Hunter & Konieczny, 2010 
Besides such atom-centric measures, there are some formula-centric measures built upon minimal inconsistent subsets (Hunter & Konieczny, 2010; Mu, 2015) . Here formula-centric measures refer to ones that take into account the number of formulas required for inconsistency (Hunter & Konieczny, 2010) . We use the measure I dr (Mu, 2015) (a slightly restricted version also called d-hit inconsistency measure in Grant & Hunter, 2013) to exemplify the formula-centric measure. Here I dr (K) is exactly the minimum number of formulas that have to be removed from K to break all the minimal inconsistent subsets of K. However, given an inconsistent knowledge base, neither the formula-centric nor the atom-centric gives a full characterization of inconsistency in that base. They describe the inconsistency from their own respective perspectives. Roughly speaking, atom-centric measures are not necessarily able to capture the effect of syntactic changes of a knowledge base on the characterization of inconsistency, whilst formula-centric measures cannot capture the proportion of language affected by inconsistency explicitly. To illustrate this, here we consider three knowledge bases K 5 , K 6 , and K 7 built upon variables {a, b, c}, where
, and I dr (K 5 ) = 2 > 1 = I dr (K 6 ) = I dr (K 7 ). Note that we need remove at least two formulas to restore the consistency for K 5 , whilst we need only remove one formula a ∧ b to restore the consistency for K 6 . Such a syntax-related difference in characterizing inconsistency between K 5 and K 6 captured by I dr cannot be captured by I LPm . On the other hand, the atom-related difference between K 6 and K 7 captured by I LPm cannot be captured by I dr . Then it is advisable to integrate the two kinds of measures for cases where both perspectives are considered important to characterize inconsistency. Here we construct a bi-measure I f B (K) = √ (I f (K)) 2 + (I LPm (K)) 2 to capture the inconsistency from both perspectives, where I f is a normalized formula-centric measure. Obviously,
. Moreover, the inconsistency measure I f B satisfies the properties of Consistency, Monotony, Dominance, and Bi-free Formula Independence, if I f satisfies the properties of Consistency, Monotony, Dominance, and Free Formula Independence. For example, it has been shown that the formula-centric inconsistency measure I dr satisfies the properties of Consistency, Monotony, Dominance, and Free Formula Independence (Mu, 2018) . Then we can construct such a bi-measure I dr B (K) = √ (1 − e −I dr (K) ) 2 + (I LPm (K)) 2 based on the normalization 1 − e −I dr (K) of I dr (K). Moreover, under this bi-measure, we have that I dr B (K 5 ) =
√
(1 − 1 e 2 ) 2 + 4 9 > √ (1 − 1 e ) 2 + 4 9 = I dr B (K 6 ) > √ (1 − 1 e ) 2 + 1 9 = I dr B (K 7 ). On the other hand, concepts of ⋆-innocuous formulas, ⋆-free formulas, and ⋆-conflicts parameterised by an arbitrary consequence operation Cn ⋆ presented by Bona and Hunter (2017) generalize the notions of free formula and minimal inconsistent subset to capture uncontroversial and controversial formulas with regard to consistency restore procedures formalized by the consequence operation Cn ⋆ , respectively. These provide an interesting perspective to reveal hidden conflicts behind minimal inconsistent subsets, and then to find really uncontroversial formulas. Roughly speaking, ⋆-innocuous formulas of a knowledge base refer to those that might be consistently added after ⋆-consolidating the rest of the base, whilst ⋆-free formulas refer to those not involved in the derivation of a formula in a minimal inconsistent subset of the Cn ⋆ -closure (Bona & Hunter, 2017) . For example, when we use the identity function-based consequence operation Cn Id such that Cn Id ({φ}) = {φ} for any formula φ, then the corresponding consolidation is exactly AGMconsolidation. Moreover, ⋆-conflicts of a knowledge base are exactly minimal inconsistent subsets of that base, and both ⋆-innocuous formulas and ⋆-free formulas are exactly free formulas of a knowledge base (Bona & Hunter, 2017) . But if we consider classical consequence operation Cn, then both ⋆-innocuous formulas and ⋆-free formulas are exactly tautologies (Bona & Hunter, 2017) .
Note that these concepts assume that Cn ⋆ is a Tarskian consequence operation. This requires that Cn ⋆ is monotonic. However, it has been shown by Priest (1991) that LP m consequence relation is non-monotonic. This implies that we may not instantiate such concepts based on LP m consequence relation to analyze independence of formulas of inconsistency in Priest's minimally inconsistent LP directly.
Conclusion
Formulas Independent of inconsistency are of interest to analyzing and measuring inconsistency. The free formula has been considered as a kind of formulas independent of inconsistency when the inconsistency is characterized by minimal inconsistent subsets. However, not all the free formulas are independent of the inconsistency when the inconsistency is characterized by some paraconsistent models.
In this paper, we have identified formulas independent of inconsistency in the framework of Priest's minimally inconsistent LP LP m . The B-atom-free formula, as a counterpart of free formula, has been proposed based on the invariance of inconsistency characterization. Just as the case of free formula, the B-atom-free formula covers some formulas not independent of inconsistency in syntactic characterization. Then we proposed the notion of Bi-free formula, which exactly covers formulas independent of inconsistency in both formula-centric and atom-centric characterizations. Several corresponding alternatives of the property of Free Formula Independence have been also proposed.
